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 1 
THE ROBERT L. LEVINE 
DISTINGUISHED LECTURE SERIES 
COLORBLIND CONSTITUTIONALISM 
Randall Kennedy* 
 
PROF. ZIPURSKY:  Good afternoon, everyone.  It’s my pleasure to 
welcome you this afternoon to the Robert Levine Lecture. 
For more than twenty years, the children of Robert L. Levine have 
supported the Levine Lecture at Fordham Law School, bringing to our law 
school great figures, such as Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, Judge Leon 
Higginbotham, Professors Ronald Dworkin, Martha Minow, Louis Henkin, 
and many, many more.  It’s an honor to add to our list of esteemed Levine 
Lecturers Professor Randall Kennedy. 
Professor Kennedy, the Michael R. Klein Professor at Harvard Law 
School, is a towering figure in legal academia.  He comes, of course, with 
golden credentials, a graduate of Princeton, Oxford, and Yale, and a law 
clerk to Judge James Skelly Wright and Justice Thurgood Marshall.  While 
Professor Kennedy is the author of several important books and 
innumerable articles, he has also been friend, teacher, and mentor to many 
of our colleagues here at Fordham Law School. 
When I think of Professor Kennedy, I do not think of all of his objective 
accomplishments and personal connections; I think of his work, and in 
particular of his extraordinary book, Race, Crime, and the Law.1  You will, 
I hope, excuse me for being a little bit cynical when I say that many books 
about the law by leading scholars tend to be overblown theory or thinly 
veiled politics.  Professor Kennedy’s Race, Crime, and the Law is neither of 
those.  It is empirical and careful, without losing the forest for the trees; it’s 
politically significant and pointed, without being grandiose or strident; and 
it is deeply synthetic about race, crime, and the law in a way that I learned 
from greatly when I read it as a starting law professor. 
That’s why I mention this, because when I realized he would be our 
Levine Lecturer, I remembered what a fine experience it was as a starting 
 
*  Michael R. Klein Professor, Harvard Law School.  Professor Kennedy is the author, most 
recently, of FOR DISCRIMINATION:  RACE, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND THE LAW (2013).  These 
remarks were made during a lecture at Fordham University School of Law on February 5, 
2013.  The text of his remarks has been lightly edited.  The views expressed herein are his 
alone. 
 1. RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW (1997). 
2 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
law professor to read his book, which really did what one hopes a book can 
do. 
So it’s intensely gratifying to have Professor Kennedy presenting a 
lecture today that comes from his next book, boldly addressing color 
consciousness and the law. 
Without further ado, Professor Kennedy. 
PROF. KENNEDY:  Thank you very much for the gracious introduction.  
I would like to thank all of those who have facilitated this gathering.  It’s a 
great pleasure to be here. 
I’m going to address my remarks to the idea of colorblindness.  
Colorblindness is a key idea in American life.  It stands for the proposition 
that race ought to play no role in assessing individuals.  Some see it as a 
long-term aspiration that should not be demanded immediately.  They say 
they yearn for the day when race has sunk into irrelevancy, but contend that 
comprehensive colorblindness immediately is premature.  They associate 
themselves with Justice Harry Blackmun’s statement that “[i]n order to get 
beyond racism, we must first take account of race.”2  This is the camp of 
the colorblind gradualist. 
Other proponents of colorblindness are “immediatists.”  They insist that 
in order to make race irrelevant, one must make it irrelevant now.  Chief 
Justice John Roberts reflected the sentiments of that camp when he and a 
majority of the justices voted in 2007 to strike down a racially selected 
student assignment plan instituted to retain racial balance.3  “The way to 
stop discrimination on the basis of race,” Roberts insisted, “is to stop 
discriminating on the basis of race.”4 
Another colorblind immediatist, Professor William Van Alstyne, put it 
this way:  “[O]ne gets beyond racism by getting beyond it now:  by a 
complete, resolute, and credible commitment never to tolerate in one’s own 
life—or in the life or practice of one’s government—the differential 
treatment of other human beings by race.”5  “That,” according to Van 
Alstyne, “is the great lesson for government itself to teach:  in all we do in 
life, whatever we do in life, to treat any person less well than another or to 
favor any more than another for being black or white or brown or red, is 
wrong.”6 
Immediatists come in at least two varieties.  One views all racial 
discrimination, including affirmative action, as having always been illicit.  
A second views affirmative action as having been useful as a needed 
expedient in the late 1960s and early 1970s, but as an intervention that 
became disastrously entrenched, requiring uprooting.  There is a consensus 
among immediatists, however, that whatever the proper status of 
 
 2. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring). 
 3. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
 4. Id. at 748. 
 5. William Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage:  Race, the Supreme Court, and the 
Constitution, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 809 (1979). 
 6. Id. at 809–10. 
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affirmative action in the past, currently it should play no role in American 
life. 
Well, to take the measure of colorblindness, especially as it relates to 
affirmative action, I chart its history, note its attractions, and posit its 
weaknesses.  I conclude that as an aspiration and strategy, colorblindness is 
misconceived.  The single most widely cited statement associated with the 
idea of colorblindness is a declaration by Justice John Marshall Harlan:  “In 
respect of civil rights, common to all citizens, the Constitution of the United 
States does not . . . permit any public authority to know the race of those 
entitled to be protected in the enjoyment of such rights. . . .  There is no 
caste here.  Our Constitution is colorblind, and neither knows nor tolerates 
classes among citizens.”7 
Harlan made this statement dissenting from the Supreme Court’s ruling 
in Plessy v. Ferguson in 1896.  That was the holding which upheld the 
constitutionality of a Louisiana law that required passengers of different 
races to occupy equal but separate cars on intrastate trains.8  The Court 
concluded that compulsory racial separation was reasonable in light of 
custom and public opinion.9  Justice Harlan, by contrast, saw the law as a 
stigmatizing brand inflicted on Negroes.10 
Harlan’s assertion that government ought not be allowed to make racial 
distinctions in the enjoyment of civil rights stemmed in part from a resilient 
but marginalized strand of thought and feeling in nineteenth-century 
America.  One set of contributors to this tradition was the women dissidents 
who petitioned the Massachusetts legislature in 1839 to repeal all laws 
which made any distinction on account of color.11  Another contributor to 
this tradition was Charles Sumner, who, attacking racial segregation in the 
Boston public schools, maintained that any and all racial discriminations 
amounted to unacceptable manifestations of caste.12 
More immediately, Justice Harlan’s invocation of the colorblind 
Constitution echoed the brief of the losing lawyer in Plessy v. Ferguson.  
Albion Tourgée remarked that “Justice is pictured blind and her daughter, 
the Law, ought at least to be color-blind.”13  Condensing that language, 
Justice Harlan made it more memorable. 
Justice Harlan offered no historical or textual support for his claim that 
our Constitution is colorblind.  There is little support to offer.  
Congressional framers of the Fourteenth Amendment declined to accept 
language that would have expressly prohibited government from drawing 
racial lines.  Wendell Phillips—the great Wendell Phillips—proposed a 
 
 7. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 554, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 8. Id. at 550–51 (majority opinion). 
 9. Id. at 552. 
 10. Id. at 562 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 11. ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION 22 (1992). 
 12. Id. at 42–43. 
 13. Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 19, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (No. 210), 
1893 WL 10660, at *19, reprinted in 13 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:  CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 46 (Philip B. Kurland & 
Gerhard Casper eds., 1975). 
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Fourteenth Amendment which would have proclaimed that “No State shall 
make any distinction in civil rights and privileges . . . on account of race, 
color, or descent.”14  If adopted, that proposal would have required as a 
constitutional rule colorblind immediatism.  That proposal, however, was 
not accepted.  What was, is a purposely open-ended standard that says 
nothing explicitly whatsoever about racial distinctions. 
Moreover, many of the framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment countenanced laws that explicitly differentiated people on a 
racial basis.  In a few instances, Congress enacted laws that benefited only 
colored persons.15  More widespread in the late 1860s were state laws that 
separated people along racial lines.16  Most discussed at the time were laws 
that prohibited people of different races from marrying one another.17  
When asked whether such statutes were inconsistent with the demand that 
states afford all persons the equal protection of the laws, the principal 
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment replied that there was no such 
inconsistency; after all, whites could not marry blacks, just as blacks could 
not marry whites.18  All were subject to the same law, and thus were treated 
equally. 
The U.S. Supreme Court ratified that understanding of the Equal 
Protection Clause in 1883, thirteen years before Plessy v. Ferguson, in a 
unanimous ruling that included Justice Harlan.  In Pace v. Alabama, the 
Supreme Court upheld an Alabama law that more harshly punished 
interracial as opposed to intraracial fornication.19  Since the law applied the 
same set of punishments to whites as well as blacks, the Court saw no 
constitutional infirmity in the statute.20 
True, even at the dawn of the Equal Protection Clause, there were some 
who repudiated oppressive racial laws that were camouflaged by the forms 
of racial neutrality.  But that perspective was an outlier among those with 
political influence. 
In addition to the absence of any reference by Harlan to a textual or 
intentionalist constitutional basis for his famous declaration is another 
noteworthy feature, one often obscured by casebook editors and others who 
 
 14. KULL, supra note 11, at 62. 
 15. See, e.g., Second Freedmen’s Bureau Act, ch. 200, 14 Stat. 173 (1866). 
 16. See, e.g., Peter Wallenstein, Race, Marriage, and the Law of Freedom:  Alabama 
and Virginia, 1860s–1960s, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 371, 377–78 (1994) (citing an 1867 
Alabama statute that mandated imprisonment for two to seven years for whites and blacks 
who engaged in a sexual relationship while living together, regardless of their marital status). 
 17. See, e.g., KULL, supra note 11, at 76–77. 
 18. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation 
Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 58 (1955) (arguing that the Equal Protection Clause, like the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866, was not meant to apply to antimiscegenation statutes); id. at 15–16 
(noting that Moderate Republicans like William Pitt Fessenden and Lyman Trumbull stated 
that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 would not invalidate antimiscegenation laws because they 
were not discriminatory, as “Negroes could not marry whites and whites could not marry 
Negroes” (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 505–06 (1866))). 
 19. Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883). 
 20. See id. at 585. 
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decline to quote what the Justice stated immediately before his allusion to 
colorblindness.  He wrote, 
 The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country.  
And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in 
power.  So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it remains true 
to its great heritage and holds fast to the principles of constitutional 
liberty.21 
What Harlan seems to be saying is that to remain ascendant, the 
dominant race need not resort to ruses like equal but separate, precisely 
because it is dominant and will continue to be for all time, if it observes the 
principles of constitutional liberty.  These principles, he suggested, pose no 
real threat to white supremacy.  Under the new regime of the Thirteenth, 
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, white supremacy in American 
society could continue unabated, albeit under a new, unofficial form. 
This reading of Harlan’s colorblindness declaration comports realistically 
with the historical, as opposed to the romanticized, Justice Harlan.  After 
all, he was a former slave owner, initially opposed the Thirteenth 
Amendment, and tolerated various forms of segregation, notwithstanding 
his Plessy dissent.22 
Whatever its limitations, the Harlan dissent did challenge Jim Crow 
segregation.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, therefore, it was absent from the pages 
of the United States Reports during the long period when segregation was 
seen as an innocuous racial distinction as opposed to a dangerous racial 
discrimination. 
But the absence continued even after the Court began to view segregation 
critically.  References to the Harlan dissent appear neither in Brown v. 
Board of Education23 nor any of the other Supreme Court decisions in the 
1950s that invalidated state laws requiring racial segregation.  The first time 
the Harlan declaration surfaces explicitly in a Supreme Court opinion 
subsequent to Plessy v. Ferguson is a concurring opinion by Justice 
William O. Douglas in a 1961 case, Garner v. Louisiana, that invalidated 
the arrest of civil rights demonstrators.24  That reference, however, is 
fleeting.  For the remainder of the 1960s, it does not reappear. 
The Harlan declaration becomes an oft-used rhetorical weapon only later, 
when it was deployed against affirmative action policies.  Justice Potter 
Stewart inaugurated the practice in 1980, when he began a dissent to the 
Court’s validation of a federal minority business set-aside program by 
quoting Harlan.25  Elaborating, Stewart wrote that in Plessy, the Court had 
upheld “a statute that required the separation of people on the basis of their 
race . . . because it was a ‘reasonable’ exercise of legislative power and had 
 
 21. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 22. See Alan F. Westin, John Marshall Harlan and the Constitutional Rights of 
Negroes:  The Transformation of a Southerner, 66 YALE L.J. 637, 637–38, 642, 653 (1957); 
see also Goodwin Liu, The First Justice Harlan, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1383, 1385–88 (2008). 
 23. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 24. Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 177, 184–85 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 25. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 522–23 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
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been ‘enacted in good faith for the promotion [of] the public good.’”26  
“Today,” he complained, “the Court upholds a statute that accords a 
preference to citizens who are ‘Negroes, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, 
Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts,’ for much the same reasons.  I think today’s 
decision is wrong for the same reason that Plessy v. Ferguson was 
wrong.”27 
In 1989, Justice Antonin Scalia invoked “our Constitution is colorblind” 
to explain his vote to invalidate a municipal business set-aside program 
analogous to the one which Justice Stewart had objected to.  According to 
Justice Scalia, 
The difficulty of overcoming the effects of past discrimination is as 
nothing compared with the difficulty of eradicating from our society the 
source of those effects, which is the tendency—fatal to a Nation such as 
ours—to classify and judge men and women on the basis of their country 
of origin or the color of their skin.28 
In 2007, Justice Clarence Thomas invoked the Harlan declaration in a 
case that was not precisely an affirmative action dispute, but did involve the 
legality of state action challenged by whites who claimed that on account of 
race, their children had been victimized by reverse discrimination.29  
Supporting the plaintiffs, Justice Thomas declared, “My view of the 
Constitution is Justice Harlan’s view.”30 
Constitutional colorblindness has several apparent attractions.  It offers 
the benefit of seeming moral clarity, which is, as Michael Kinsley 
observes,31 a great rhetorical plus.  The colorblind position—disregard race 
altogether in assessing people—is vivid, succinct, and simple.  It enjoys the 
bumper-sticker advantage.  It is a clear rule, understandable to all and 
amenable to accountability.  It appears to promise a clean break with a 
longstanding and ugly practice.32 
Colorblindness also offers the allure of heroic associations.  Earlier, I 
quoted the colorblindness rhetoric of nineteenth-century radical, racial 
egalitarian Wendell Phillips.  His ideological heirs kept this rhetoric alive 
throughout the twentieth century. 
The first time racial colorblindness surfaces in the pages of The New 
York Times is a story that appears December 26, 1942.  The story begins in 
the following way:  “Complete social, political, and economic emancipation 
for the Negro in a world that is seeking true democracy was advocated here 
[in Black Mountain, North Carolina] today by the Fellowship of Southern 
 
 26. Id. at 523 (quoting Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550 (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
 27. Id. 
 28. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520 (1989) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
 29. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 772 (2007) 
(Thomas, J., concurring). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Michael Kinsley, The Spoils of Victimhood, NEW YORKER, Mar. 27, 1995, at 62. 
 32. Id. 
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Churchmen in a statement which calls upon all followers of democracy and 
Christianity to become color blind.”33 
Shortly after, the Times quotes Ralph Bunche, declaring that “[r]eal 
democracy . . . is color-blind.”34 
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, in books, sermons, speeches, editorials, 
essays, letters, briefs, and conversations, opponents of segregation raised 
high the banner of colorblindness to shame, challenge, and overcome state-
enforced racial separateness.  Justice Thomas and other champions of 
conservative constitutional colorblindness are not fabricating the quotations 
in which the lawyers attacking segregation praised colorblindness. 
The appellants in Brown v. Board of Education did declare in their brief, 
“That the Constitution is colorblind is our dedicated belief.”35  That’s what 
Thurgood Marshall and company stated. 
During oral argument, the representatives of the appellants did assert, 
“We have one fundamental contention which we will seek to develop . . . 
and that contention is that no state has any authority under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to use race as a factor in 
affording educational opportunities among its citizens.”36 
Judge Constance Baker Motley did state that the bible to which the great 
Thurgood Marshall turned in his depressed moments was the Harlan 
declaration.37 
A major lesson articulated by leading figures in the civil rights revolution 
was that assessment without regard to race was the proper, enlightened, 
virtuous way to judge individuals.  Of course, that view was always 
contested.  The civil rights revolution was a hydra-headed movement.  But 
colorblindness was one of its signature themes.  That theme gained 
enormous prestige, and understandably so.  It seemed to be the very 
antithesis of segregationist race consciousness.  It voiced a healthy desire to 
break free from the suffocating anticolored bigotry that had saturated every 
sphere of American life.  It expressed an urge to tear away blinders that 
prevent people from appreciating fully the humanity of others. 
Constitutional colorblindness—at least certain versions of it—also 
displays other attractions.  One is a healthy skepticism regarding capacities 
to distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable racial distinctions.  
 
 33. Churchmen Urge Full Negro Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1942, at 9. 
 34. Democracy is Color-Blind, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1951, at 8E. 
 35. Brief for Appellants in Nos. 1, 2 and 4 and for Respondents in No. 10 on 
Reargument at 65, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (No. 8), 1953 WL 78288, at 
*65. 
 36. Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (No. 
8). 
 37. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 773 (2007) 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting IN MEMORIAM:  HONORABLE THURGOOD MARSHALL, 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE BAR AND OFFICERS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, at 
X (1993) (remarks of Judge Constance Baker Motley)). 
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After all, leading twentieth-century jurists—Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.38 
and Louis Brandeis39—failed to recognize Jim Crow racial distinctions as a 
constitutional evil.  And in Korematsu v. United States, a Supreme Court 
that decried invidious racial discrimination simultaneously affirmed it in an 
egregious ruling upholding the unwarranted internment of people of 
Japanese descent during World War II—a ruling agreed with by some of the 
leading civil libertarians and civil rights champions of the day.40 
A colorblind constitutionalist might well argue, with Korematsu in mind, 
that in the presence of the entrancing race line, no one, including the judges, 
can safely be trusted.  Where race is concerned, the colorblind 
constitutionalist might contend, we must lean over backwards to protect 
ourselves from ourselves. 
There are, however, problems with the proposition that under our 
Constitution the government may not make distinctions on the basis of race.  
For one thing, few who purport to embrace this proposition are truly 
committed to erasing all governmental racial distinctions.  Most who have 
purported to embrace that proposition have a narrower commitment than 
that:  colorblindness in routine matters, but with a safety hatch that permits 
attentiveness to race when necessary. 
In Johnson v. California, the Supreme Court adjudicated the 
constitutionality of a policy under which California prison officials racially 
segregated prisoners for their first several weeks of incarceration to prevent 
violence fomented by racial gangs.41  The Court held that, despite the 
prison context, officials were still required to justify this racial 
discrimination to the same extent as any other governmental racial 
discrimination.42  Justices Thomas and Scalia dissented.43  The Court’s 
leading colorblind immediatists argued that a due regard for the expertise of 
prison authorities and the reality of prison violence justified relaxing the 
normal rules regulating governmental racial distinctions.44 
Their argument is reasonable, but dramatically at odds with the 
declaration that our Constitution is colorblind.  Thomas and Scalia say that 
they believe that the Constitution should be colorblind, except in an 
emergency.45  That raises the question of why the lingering destructive 
consequences of past racial wrongs do not count as emergencies that justify 
the use of racially selective measures.  These circumstances could be 
deemed emergencies. 
 
 38. See, e.g., Berea Coll. v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 51, 58 (1908) (affirming the 
conviction of a teacher for educating white and black students together).  Justice Holmes 
concurred in the judgment but did not write an opinion. Id. at 58. 
 39. See Christopher A. Bracey, Louis Brandeis and the Race Question, 52 ALA. L. REV. 
859, 868 (2001). 
 40. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 41. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 502 (2005). 
 42. Id. at 512. 
 43. Id. at 524 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Justice Scalia joined Justice Thomas’s dissent 
but did not write his own. See id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 540. 
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What Professor Nathan Glazer observed decades ago continues to obtain 
today. 
[G]eneral principles that mean justice are often suspended to correct 
special cases of injustice, as when the immigration laws are suspended to 
let in a body of political refugees, or tax moneys are made available to 
those suffering from flood or other disasters.  Negroes are the victims of a 
man-made disaster more serious than any flood . . . .46 
Glazer is absolutely right.  Racial minorities, particularly blacks, have been 
hit by man-made disasters more serious than any flood.  But Thomas, 
Scalia, and those of similar mind have decided to decline designating those 
catastrophes as such.  By conceding, however, that in some circumstances 
the government may properly differentiate on a racial basis, Thomas, 
Scalia, and other colorblind immediatists confess that they do not believe 
literally that government must never make racial distinctions.  Rather, they 
believe that only under exceptional circumstances may the government 
properly differentiate on a racial basis.  The issue then becomes identifying 
those circumstances—a task that gives rise to the inescapable messiness of 
line drawing.  The vaunted simplicity and clarity of constitutional 
colorblindness is not so simple and clear after all. 
Previously I noted that an allure of colorblindness is association with 
admirable figures who have used colorblindness rhetoric to oppose white 
supremacism.  I think here of the abolitionists—William Lloyd Garrison, 
Wendell Phillips, founders of the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People, and the organizers of the Student 
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee.  All of those people—all of those 
people—at one time or another spoke the rhetoric of colorblindness.  And 
they are indeed entitled to great respect and gratitude. 
One should recognize, however, another facet of the history of 
colorblindness:  false proponents who use its rhetoric only 
opportunistically.  Enemies of Brown v. Board of Education long fought 
against it, only to embrace a narrow version of the landmark ruling to 
forestall the implementation of a broader conception of desegregation.  
Similarly, white supremacists long fought against any and all versions of 
colorblindness, only eventually to embrace a version serviceable for 
suppressing affirmative action.  This describes the trajectory of a number of 
influential figures.  I think of a number of senators.  I think of Senator Sam 
Ervin.  I think of Senator Jesse Helms. 
It also describes the evolution of Supreme Court Justice and later Chief 
Justice William H. Rehnquist.  A law clerk to Justice Robert Jackson when 
Brown v. Board of Education was before the Supreme Court, the young 
Rehnquist opposed invalidating segregation, though he later lied about this 
matter during confirmation hearings before the Senate.47  He lied on two 
 
 46. NATHAN GLAZER, THE SOCIAL BASIS OF AMERICAN COMMUNISM 181–82 (1961). 
 47. See Nomination of Justice William Hubbs Rehnquist To Be Chief Justice of the 
United States:  Hearings Before the S. Committee on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 161–63, 224 
(1986). 
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occasions, in fact.48  Nothing that Rehnquist did prior to his elevation to the 
high court suggested that he had substantially changed his mind as he 
matured.  Then, as a Justice, he persistently sought to constrain Brown’s 
scope.49  He also resisted exporting to new areas antidiscrimination norms 
helpful to racial minorities.  For example, when the issue arose whether 
racially discriminatory peremptory challenges should be prohibited as 
violative of the Equal Protection Clause, Justice Rehnquist, 
characteristically, voted in the negative.50 
With remarkably few exceptions, he somehow managed to avoid 
discerning illicit discrimination against racial minorities in the many cases 
that came before him during his long tenure.51  Just as consistently, he ruled 
in favor of whites claiming to be victims of reverse discrimination in 
affirmative action litigation.52 
Rehnquist was a notably low-key justice.  His opinions typically 
displayed little emotion.  But in several affirmative action disputes, 
Rehnquist exhibited an indignation that seldom surfaced in other contexts.53  
Indifferent to or tolerant of racial policies that wrongly disadvantaged racial 
minorities, Rehnquist was keenly alert to racial policies he perceived as 
unfair to whites.  Resistant to colorblind constitutionalism when open, 
invidious racial discrimination oppressed colored people, Rehnquist was all 
too willing to deploy colorblindness against affirmative action that 
benefited racial minorities. 
I am not suggesting that racism infects all opposition to affirmative 
action.  I am saying, though, that racism does infect some substantial 
element of that opposition. 
Immediatists’ colorblindness is also marred by an insistence on the part 
of some of its proponents that affirmative action is the moral and legal 
equivalent of Jim Crow segregation and kindred forms of racial oppression.  
A striking example is found in the jurisprudence of Justice Clarence 
Thomas, who declares, 
I believe that there is a moral and constitutional equivalence between laws 
designed to subjugate a race and those that distribute benefits on the basis 
of race in order to foster some current notion of equality. . . . 
 
 48. See id. 
 49. See, e.g., Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 254–56 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
 50. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 134 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 51. See, e.g., Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982); 
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972). But see Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 
222 (1985). 
 52. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson 
Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986); Fullilove 
v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); 
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 53. See, e.g., Weber, 443 U.S. at 222 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“Thus, by a tour de 
force reminiscent not of jurists such as Hale, Holmes, and Hughes, but of escape artists such 
as Houdini, the Court eludes clear statutory language, ‘uncontradicted’ legislative history 
and uniform precedent in concluding that employers are, after all, permitted to consider race 
in making employment decisions.”). 
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 That these programs may have been motivated, in part, by good 
intentions cannot provide refuge from the principle that under our 
Constitution, the government may not make distinctions on the basis of 
race. . . . 
 . . . . 
 In my mind, government-sponsored racial discrimination based on 
benign prejudice is just as noxious as discrimination inspired by malicious 
prejudice.  In each instance, it is racial discrimination, plain and simple.54 
Thomas’s equation of racial distinction intended to impose white 
supremacy with racial distinctions intended to undo white supremacy is one 
of the silliest formulations in all of American law.  When the University of 
Texas practiced Jim Crow segregation, it excluded all blacks categorically 
because they were black, pursuant to a state policy that was based on a 
belief in the contaminating inferiority of African Americans and a desire to 
express and propound that belief.  When the University of Texas practices 
affirmative action, the policy decreases, by a relatively small amount, 
whites’ chances for admission.  The majority of seats at the university 
continue to be occupied by whites.55  When affirmative action contributes 
to the rejection of a white candidate who would have been accepted if he or 
she were black, the aim is not to express or propound racial contempt.  The 
aim is to undo past racial wrongs or to foster integration or to facilitate 
diversity. 
Those who say that intent is immaterial are wrong.  An accidental slap is 
altogether different from an intentional one.  A sign declaring “Blacks 
Welcome” means something altogether different from a sign declaring 
“Blacks Unwelcome,” though both contain a racial distinction. 
Now, just one more word on this.  Colorblind constitutionalism does not 
require negating the obvious difference between segregation and affirmative 
action.  One could concede, as one sensibly should, that invidious 
discrimination rests on a different moral and legal plane than positive 
discrimination—i.e., affirmative action—yet still conclude that the latter is 
unwise and unlawful.  One could take that position. 
Judge Thomas Gibbs Gee showed this to be so in an opinion voicing his 
disagreement with a Supreme Court decision upholding an affirmative 
action program.56  Judge Gee said that as a lower court judge, he would 
follow what he perceived to be the Supreme Court’s erroneous judgment 
because to him affirmative action was merely mistaken as opposed to evil.57  
Judge Gee declared that if he thought affirmative action was evil, truly 
 
 54. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240–41 (1995) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (alterations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 55. See, e.g., THE UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN OFFICE OF INFO. MGMT. & ANALYSIS, 
STUDENT CHARACTERISTICS FALL 2011, at 1, 3 (2011), available at 
www.utexas.edu/academic/ima/sites/default/files/SHB11-12Students.pdf. 
 56. See Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 611 F.2d 132, 133 (5th Cir. 1980). 
 57. See id. 
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equivalent to segregation, he would have felt honor bound to resign rather 
than enforce malevolent social policy.58 
Justice Thomas and like-minded immediatists, however, refuse to make 
such distinctions and, instead, paint with excessively broad strokes, 
proclaiming all the while that their own personal policy preferences have 
nothing to do with their rulings. 
Using the equivalence of negative and positive racial discrimination as a 
predicate, purveyors of colorblind immediatism threaten to devour public 
policies that are much needed in the ongoing struggle against racial 
hierarchy that the colorblind slogan once hated.  Clearly, colorblind 
immediatism threatens affirmative action in all of its various guises, both 
the hard forms of affirmative action and the softer versions. 
It also threatens other much-needed legal devices.  It threatens the 
disparate impact theory of racial discrimination.  But it goes further than 
that.  A strong version of colorblind immediatism could theoretically 
threaten disparate treatment antidiscrimination law, as well as programs that 
say nothing about race on their face, but are proposed for the purpose of 
assisting racial minorities.  Many observers see the most traditional 
antidiscrimination laws as a fundamentally different kind from affirmative 
action, and thus wholly insulated from the objections of immediatist 
colorblind constitutionalists.  Like affirmative action, however, the ban on 
racial disparate treatment—that is to say, intentionally disfavoring a person 
because of his race—the old-fashioned model, the narrowest model of 
antidiscrimination law—that model also requires race consciousness.  A 
simple charge of racial disparate treatment requires a court or other 
adjudicator to identify the race of the plaintiff, or at least the perceived race 
of the plaintiff. 
Furthermore, the aim to redistribute resources along racial lines was the 
primary legislative purpose behind Title VII and the other 
antidiscrimination statutes.59  Prior to Title VII, racially unregulated 
employment markets severely disadvantaged black workers even when they 
possessed skills and education comparable to white competitors.  To assist 
black workers within the confines of equal opportunity competition was the 
primary aim animating the coalition that ultimately succeeded in passing 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.60 
Some in this coalition may have been more interested in other things—
economic efficiency, electoral calculation, paying off a political debt—but 
the most influential, urgent, and publicly expressed purpose of Title VII 
was to assist black Americans.61  Yet that aim is illicit according to some 
versions of colorblind immediatism. 
 
 58. See id. (“Subordinate magistrates such as I must either obey the orders of higher 
authority or yield up their posts to those who will.  I obey, since in my view the action 
required of me by the Court’s mandate is only to follow a mistaken course and not an evil 
one.”). 
 59. See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202–07 (1979). 
 60. See id. 
 61. See id. 
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Now, there is little chance that immediatists will challenge, much less 
dislodge, disparate treatment antidiscrimination law.  Regardless of the 
collective intent with which it was conceived, disparate treatment 
antidiscrimination law is pervasively viewed now as colorblind and 
uncontroversial.  It is simply too deeply embedded for anyone to attack 
without suffering severe discreditation. 
But theoretically—theoretically—a robust version of colorblind 
constitutionalism does pose a real threat to basic antidiscrimination law.  
More vulnerable are policies that are facially race silent, but established 
primarily for reasons of racial redistribution. 
Following a court decision barring racial affirmative action at the 
University of Texas,62 the Texas legislature enacted a plan under which any 
student in the top 10 percent of his or her high school graduating class 
became automatically eligible for admission to the university.63  This 
legislation was proposed and passed for the publicly expressed purpose of 
recovering at least some of the racial diversity lost on account of the 
abolition of the more conventional affirmative action program under which 
race had been explicitly counted as a plus by admissions officials.64 
The Texas 10 percent plan is widely dubbed “race-neutral.”65  Any 
mention of race is absent from its criteria, and thus all students are eligible 
for its benefits.  More whites than Latinos or blacks obtain entry to the 
university through its program.66 
But is the top 10 percent program really race blind?  It is difficult to see 
how that label can be applied to a program which was established mainly 
for the purpose of doing, in a roundabout way, what the invalidated 
affirmative action program had done more directly by explicitly counting 
racial minority status as a plus in admissions competition. 
The top 10 percent plan arose from a keen concern with the racial 
demographics of the students admitted to the University of Texas, not from 
a race-blind indifference to those demographics.67  Moreover, if the racial 
shoe were on the other foot, if the Texas legislature passed a law for the 
purpose of increasing the number of white students admitted to the 
university system, opponents would rightly label that law an exercise in 
illicit racial discrimination.  Race would be absent from the face of the 
policy, but deeply present right beneath the surface. 
 
 62. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 63. 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 304–06 (West); see also TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803 
(West 2009). 
 64. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2415–16 (2013). 
 65. See, e.g., Studies Show Race-Neutral College Admissions Could Work, USA TODAY 
(Oct. 3, 2012, 7:59 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2012/10/03/study-
race-neutral-admissions/1609855/ (“In Texas and Georgia leading public universities use a 
race-neutral system.”). 
 66. See, e.g., THE UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN, REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR, THE LIEUTENANT 
GOVERNOR, AND THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON THE IMPLEMENTATION 
OF SB 175, 81ST LEGISLATURE FOR THE PERIOD ENDING FALL 2012, at 26–27 (2012). 
 67. See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2415–16. 
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Policies that are silent as to race but initiated for the purpose of 
establishing or maintaining racial advantage for whites are invalidated 
nowadays on the grounds that they violate the constitutional prohibition 
against government action motivated by race that cannot withstand strict 
scrutiny.68  Why, then, are policies like the Texas 10 percent plan allowed 
to stand? 
The reason is that rigorous and immediatist colorblind constitutionalism 
is yet to be fully ascendant.  Even some immediatists are willing to 
countenance racially motivated percentage plans, so long as they are silent 
as to race in form. 
On the other hand, some colorblind immediatists are already laying siege 
to policies such as the Texas 10 percent plan.  Hence, Professor Brian T. 
Fitzpatrick contends that when government actors attempt to gerrymander 
racial results by race-neutral means, these efforts are often no more legal 
than the explicit racial discrimination they are trying to avoid.69 
Ward Connerly, the anti–affirmative action activist, objects as well.  He 
writes, 
  It is not the legitimate business of government in America to promote 
“diversity.”  When the government uses “race-neutral” means to achieve a 
desired racial outcome instead of explicit race preferences, the two 
approaches become a distinction without a difference.  The deliberate 
pursuit of racial diversity by either race-neutral means or “quotas” is the 
antithesis of ensuring that individuals are guaranteed freedom from 
government discrimination and then letting the chips fall where they 
may.70 
The espousal of racial laissez-faire expressed by Professor Fitzpatrick 
and Ward Connerly highlights the biggest drawback of immediatist 
colorblindness—its equanimity in the face of a social structure still terribly 
disfigured by past and ongoing racial wrongs.  In every aspect of American 
life, racial differentials and well-being don’t just exist; they erupt, 
showering the social landscape with stark, familiar patterns.  Everybody in 
this room will certainly be familiar with these patterns:  average white life 
spans that are four to six years longer than those of blacks,71 black infant 
mortality rates that are twice those of whites,72 black poverty rates that are 
double those of whites,73 black incarceration rates that are many times those 
 
 68. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264–68 
(1977). 
 69. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Strict Scrutiny of Facially Race-Neutral State Action and the 
Texas Ten Percent Plan, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 289, 290 (2001). 
 70. Ward Connerly, No Place in Life or Law, WASH. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2003), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2003/jan/21/20030121-010425-2813r/. 
 71. LAURA B. SHRESTHA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32792, LIFE EXPECTANCY IN THE 
UNITED STATES 15 (2006), available at http://www.aging.senate.gov/crs/aging1.pdf. 
 72. Donna L. Hoyert & Jiaquan Xu, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Deaths:  
Preliminary Data for 2011, Nat’l Vital Stat. Rep., Oct. 10, 2012, at 5, available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr61/nvsr61_06.pdf. 
 73. SUZANNE MACARTNEY ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ACSBR/11-17, POVERTY RATES 
FOR SELECTED DETAILED RACE AND HISPANIC GROUPS BY STATE AND PLACE:  2007–2011, at 
1 (2013), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/acsbr11-17.pdf. 
2013] COLORBLIND CONSTITUTIONALISM 15 
of whites,74 a situation in which for every dollar of wealth held by a typical 
white family, a typical black family holds a dime.75  And those patterns 
could be replicated if we were talking about Latinos.  They could be 
replicated if we were talking about Native Americans. 
Ward Connerly says, “let[] the chips fall where they may,”76 as if where 
they will fall is a mystery, unconnected to the past and dependent only upon 
individuals’ pluck and luck.  We know, however, where the chips will fall 
in a laissez-faire regime governed by benign neglect of racial inequity.  
They will fall in favor of whites, who continue to benefit in innumerable 
ways from a long train of beliefs, habits, practices, and institutions that 
systematically privilege Euro-Americans and systematically disfavor others, 
especially blacks, Latinos, and Native Americans. 
In the face of that daunting reality, more is required than adherence to a 
merely procedural colorblindness.  What is required is a substantive 
commitment to racial justice that unavoidably entails the racial distribution 
of scarce resources. 
My remarks thus far have mainly addressed immediatist colorblindness, 
the version that would abolish affirmative action now.  What about the 
version that tolerates affirmative action for now, but awaits, with an eye on 
the clock, its departure from the American scene?  That’s the type that 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor embraced in the affirmative action case that 
she wrote a number of years ago, in which she expressed a desire, a hope 
that affirmative action would be gone in twenty-five years.77 
What about that version of constitutional colorblindness, what I’ve 
termed “gradualist” constitutional colorblindness?  I offer two responses. 
The first has to do with the question:  how long should affirmative action 
continue?  This is a useful inquiry in that it makes us think about the goals 
we envision, the progress we are making—or failing to make—in reaching 
those goals.  Colorblind constitutionalists of both the immediatist and 
gradualist variety say that they envision as their goal a country in which, 
absent emergency, officials make no racial distinctions among individuals. 
That goal, in my view, is insufficiently attentive to its political and social 
surroundings.  A policy that eschews—indeed, prohibits—routine, official 
racial distinctions would be very attractive if the antidiscrimination rule 
reflected appropriately the will of those affected, including racial 
minorities, and arose in a context in which there exists no current or 
vestigial subordination or marginalization of racial outsiders. 
A policy would be very unattractive, however, if the antidiscrimination 
rule reflected the will of the historically dominant racial group and arose in 
 
 74. MARC MAUER & RYAN S. KING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, UNEVEN JUSTICE:  STATE 
RATES OF INCARCERATION BY RACE AND ETHNICITY 4 (2007), available at 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/rd_stateratesofincbyraceandethnicity.pdf. 
 75. PAUL TAYLOR ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., WEALTH GAPS RISE TO RECORD HIGHS 
BETWEEN WHITES, BLACKS AND HISPANICS 1 (2011), available at 
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 76. See Connerly, supra note 70. 
 77. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003). 
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a context in which current and vestigial subordination or marginalization of 
racial outsiders is evident. 
The character of the antidiscrimination rule is thus contingent on its 
surroundings and consequences.  Colorblind antidiscrimination should not 
be viewed as a transcendent goal commendable no matter what the 
surrounding circumstances. 
Many proponents of colorblindness, including gradualists, still 
underestimate the burdens imposed upon people of color by past and 
ongoing racial discrimination.  The underestimation often prompts 
impatience with the victims of inequality rather than the unfair 
circumstances they face.  Seeking to preempt such impatience, Justice Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg appropriately noted that “it remains the current reality that 
many minority students encounter markedly inadequate and unequal 
educational opportunities.”78 
Alluding to Justice O’Connor’s twenty-five-year timeline, Justice 
Ginsburg cautioned that while “one may hope,” one cannot “firmly 
forecast[] that over the next generation’s span, progress toward 
nondiscrimination and genuinely equal opportunity will make it safe to 
sunset affirmative action.”79 
I have just argued that a mistaken impatience sometimes mars even 
gradualist colorblindness.  But my objection to the colorblindness motif 
itself, gradualist as well as immediatist, reaches further than that.  
According to Justice O’Connor, a “core purpose of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was to do away with all governmentally imposed 
discrimination based on race.”80  If by that she meant a core purpose of the 
Fourteenth Amendment was to abolish invidious race-based government 
action—meaning action meant to adversely affect a given racial group—I 
would agree with her.  But that is not what she meant.  O’Connor meant 
that a core purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was and is to do away 
with governmentally imposed racial discriminations, whatever their 
motivations or consequences.  I disagree with that proposition for reasons 
previously noted. 
Justice O’Connor’s putative core purpose is absent from the original 
intent of those principally responsible for framing and ratifying the 
Fourteenth Amendment and absent, too, from the constitutional text. 
What should be recalled—though it is difficult to do so, given the 
salience, popularity, and prestige of the colorblind mantra—is a point made 
by Professor Paul Freund years ago:  the constitutional mission of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is the establishment of equal protection, not 
colorblindness.81  The strategy of disregarding race—that is to say, 
colorblindness—is a methodology that can, in appropriate circumstances, 
serve as a tool helpful for attaining racial justice.  It should not, however, be 
 
 78. Id. at 346 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 341 (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984)). 
 81. PAUL A. FREUND, ON LAW AND JUSTICE 33–34 (1968). 
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elevated to the rank of a purpose, a principle, a goal in and of itself.82  The 
strategy of disregarding race can be used for good.  But it can also be used 
for bad—to cover up injustice. 
Recall that textually, the original U.S. Constitution, the Constitution of 
1787 to 1791, said nothing expressly about race.  It was, thus, in an 
important sense, race blind, even while it countenanced racial slavery and 
all manner of other forms of racial mistreatment. 
It was only when race was expressly mentioned in the legal innovations 
of Reconstruction—the Fifteenth Amendment, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 
and the other Reconstruction statutes—it was only then that American 
“pigmentocracy” was frontally challenged on a nationwide basis. 
Finally, allow me to observe that it is odd that so many have staked so 
much on a figure of speech that celebrates a disability.  Some people are 
truly colorblind.  They cannot distinguish colors.  But they are not happy 
with this.  Their incapacity is a bane.  It is past time to come up with a new 
metaphor that will better serve our desire to create within the context of our 
multiracial society a more perfect union, one decidedly more fair than we 
have today. 
Thank you very much. 
[Applause] 
PROF. ZIPURSKY:  We have a little time to take some questions. 
QUESTIONER:  A fascinating talk.  One of the most interesting things 
you said is the tension between a sort of Texas 10 percent plan, which you 
would think of constitutional colorblindness as sort of accommodating—it 
got me to think that maybe the problem with colorblindness as a norm is 
that it’s a kind of empty principle.  That is to say, the fact that you see 
various people deploying it at different points in our history suggests that 
people sort of piggyback it onto other principles that they really care about. 
For example, I’m thinking about Reva Siegel’s work on the tension 
between the anticlassification and the antisubordination.83  If what you 
really care about is anticlassification and you are piggybacking 
colorblindness on that, then you could be against Brown and against 
affirmative action, but be for a Texas 10 percent plan.  But if you really care 
about antisubordination and you’re comfortable striking down Brown, but 
not either the Texas plan or affirmative action, you could call what you’re 
doing sort of a colorblindness and piggyback on the antisubordination. 
In that sense, colorblindness, to me—I wonder if it just doesn’t state a 
sort of coherent principle, but rather is piggybacked on other constitutional 
values or social values that people really believe, but use this shortcut of 
colorblindness. 
 
 82. See id. at 33 (“The most important point to be made in considering [the] question [of 
colorblindness] is that the color-blind test is not a term of art found in the 
Constitution . . . .”). 
 83. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk:  Antisubordination and Anticlassification 
Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470 (2004). 
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PROF. KENNEDY:  The point seemed to be that the idea of 
colorblindness can be seen as an empty principle, a useful vehicle for 
people to use to get at other things they really care about. 
QUESTIONER:  And other constitutional principles. 
PROF. KENNEDY:  I think there’s something to what you say.  I don’t 
want to lose sight of the fact, however, that there are a lot of really good 
people today and in the past who have embraced colorblindness, and not 
opportunistically.  It’s the presence of those people that complicates things 
and that makes this phrase, it seems to me, a particularly interesting one in 
the life of the law. 
PROF. ZIPURSKY:  Other questions?  George Conk. 
QUESTIONER:  The thing that strikes me about the 10 percent rule is 
that we sustained affirmative action with the concurring opinion of Justice 
Harlan, and the embrace of his diversity line was essentially a statement 
that we’re going to let educators make educational judgments.  We 
sustained affirmative action for a long time on that principle.  Then, after 
Hopwood, I guess, if I have the sequence right, the Fifth Circuit struck 
down any race-conscious affirmative action in the name of merit.84 
What strikes me about the 10 percent is that it’s educationally arbitrary.  
Does that play a role in your analysis of what’s wrong with that Texas 10 
percent approach? 
It’s an embrace of existing patterns of residential—that strikes me as a 
potential vulnerability, too, on the grounds that it’s potentially 
discriminatory. 
PROF. KENNEDY:  I’m not against the Texas 10 percent plan.  I’m not 
against affirmative action.  In my view, affirmative action, the Texas 10 
percent plan, other things like that are very modest efforts to reconfigure 
opportunity in our country. 
What’s striking to me is the extreme resistance to them, because they are 
so modest.  If I were king—I like that idea—I would seek to institute 
policies that were much more robust, much more redistributist than these.  
These are what we have.  Are they vulnerable?  Sure, they’re very 
vulnerable. 
Justice Lewis Powell’s idea of affirmative action as being justified in 
higher education only on grounds of diversity85—I’ll take it, just because 
that’s what is provided, but why is that a better justification for affirmative 
action than seeking to undo a couple of centuries of racial mistreatment?  I 
don’t get it.  Why is that a better justification for affirmative action than a 
state policy of trying to integrate people who are outsiders, whether they 
have been in this country for a long period of time or not?  Recent 
immigrants who are on the outside—have they been subject to mistreatment 
 
 84. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996); see also, e.g., Lalla v. City of 
New Orleans, Nos. 96-2640, 96-2658, 98-3591, 1999 WL 138900, at *1, *4–5 (E.D. La. 
Mar. 12, 1999) (holding that a fire department’s fifty-fifty racial quota system violated white 
applicants’ equal protection rights as a matter of law). 
 85. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313–14 (1978). 
2013] COLORBLIND CONSTITUTIONALISM 19 
in the United States?  No.  But are they on the outside and we want to bring 
them in?  Yes.  It seems to me that’s a perfectly good reason to have 
affirmative action. 
I think there are a bunch of reasons better than diversity for affirmative 
action.  I’m not against the diversity rationale.  I think it’s very vulnerable, 
because the Supreme Court has knocked out everything else and so much 
pressure is put on it.86  So people have to make claims for it that, it seems to 
me, are implausible.  But that’s what we’re stuck with. 
The Texas 10 percent plan—yes, it has a bunch of vulnerabilities.  But 
that’s what we’re stuck with. 
Not only that, but we’re also stuck with a rhetoric that just—it’s very 
difficult to even talk about these things sensibly in public.  If you’re at a 
university and there’s some public forum and the authorities are talking 
about their affirmative action plan, they can’t even talk straightforwardly 
and honestly about their affirmative action plan, because there’s litigation in 
the wings.  So they have to talk this diversity language.  Everything is 
diversity, diversity, diversity, even when, in their own minds, that’s not—
they might have that in mind to some extent, but that’s clearly not what’s at 
the forefront of their minds. 
That is a part of our current scene that reiterates other episodes in 
American life.  I’m writing something now, a little book, about the civil 
rights revolution.  I’ve just been reading about the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
Title II, the section of the 1964 Civil Rights Act that prohibits racial 
discrimination in places of public accommodation.  What was the big 
constitutional fight with respect to the framing of Title II?  It was whether 
Title II was going to be justified by Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
or the Commerce Clause.  It was justified mainly on grounds of the 
Commerce Clause because in 1883, the Supreme Court in The Civil Rights 
Cases invalidated the public accommodation section of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1875.87 
So now, as we speak—right now—if you drive from New York City to 
Columbia, South Carolina, as a matter of federal law, what disables the 
owner of a restaurant or the owner of a hotel from putting up a sign saying, 
“Whites Only”?  As a matter of federal law, the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Title 
II, what gives Congress power to do that is the Commerce Clause.  That 
sign would put an undue pinch on interstate commerce. 
People knew in 1964 that that’s not really what’s going on here.  That’s 
not why people are being blown to smithereens in Birmingham, Alabama.  
That’s not why little children are braving police dogs and the fire hoses.  It 
was a matter of human dignity. 
But we couldn’t talk about that.  We had to talk about interstate 
commerce. 
 
 86. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) (“[A]s the basis 
for imposing discriminatory legal remedies that work against innocent people, societal 
discrimination is insufficient and over expansive.”). 
 87. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
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We have seen that throughout American life.  The sad fact is, we’re not 
past that.  So in the affirmative action debate, we go all around the mulberry 
bush talking about things that are not really in the forefront of our minds, 
because the legal system requires us to.  That’s a very sobering thing, and 
we should seek, by all means, to change that. 
PROF. ZIPURSKY:  This was a wonderful lecture.  So with that, we 
would like to thank you. 
PROF. KENNEDY:  Thank you again. 
[Applause] 
 
